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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
United States Antidumping Procedures 
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: 
A Crack in the Dam of Nontariff Barriers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an increasingly determined push toward world-wide free trade, the major 
trading nations have attempted to eliminate any obstacles which may prevent 
the achievement of this goal. Initially, tariffs were thought to be the primary 
obstacle to free trade. The General Agreement on 'tariffs and Trade (GATT)I 
was signed in 1947. It was the first multilateral effort aimed at the substantial 
reduction of general tariff levels throughout the world. Recently, however, it 
has become clear that while high tariffs may hamper free trade, nontariff bar-
riers prevent it absolutely. 2 The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions3 (MTN) was the first comprehensive effort by the major trading nations 
to remove the obstacles to free trade presented by non tariff barriers. The 
Tokyo Round has had a profound effect on the foreign trade laws of some of 
the signatories to the Agreements .. 
This Recent Development will begin with a general discussion of nontariff 
barriers: their character, classification and effect on world trade. Particular 
emphasis will be placed on the practice known as dumping, and antidumping 
duties. Antidumping duties are the resulting nontariffbarrier used to curb the 
practice of dumping. Second, there will be a brief analysis of the recently con-
cluded Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations followed by an ex-
amination of the statute that implements those agreements in United States 
law: the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.· Finally, the author will provide a 
guide to the current United States antidumping procedures. This guide will 
1. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950). The 
GATT is a multilateral agreement governing national action in trade policy matters. 
2. See Carter Sends Trade Pa&t to Congress for Approval, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1979, S D, at 1, 
col. 4. 
3. Since GATT was signed in 1947, there have been periodic rounds ofMTN. These rounds 
have attempted to carry out the declared intent of the original agreements. See S III infra. 
4. Pub. L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
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compare the neW provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 with the 
prior procedures contained in the Antidumping Act, 1921.5 
II. NONTARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE 
A. Trade Barriers in General 
The use of the term 'trade barrier' has become so popular6 that one might 
think of it as an easily defined and widely understood term of art. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case. Trade barriers elude any fixed definition and 
those definitions that have' been devised are not suitable for all applications. 
One suggested definition of trade barriers encompasses any measure (public 
or private) that causes internationally traded goods and services, or resources 
devoted to the production of these goods and services, to be allocated so as to 
reduce potential world income.' This definition is unrealistic insofar as it 
describes a theoretically perfect economic definition, leaving extremely in-
definite boundaries for pragmatic application. A similarly broad definition 
might include any measure or attitude which distorts the natural course of 
world trade by favoring one nation over another. 8 
These broad definitions have been limited and qualified when applied to 
specific trade barriers with the type of qualification dependent on the par-
ticular circumstances involved. For example, the definition has been limited to 
those government laws, regulations, policies or practices intended to protect 
domestic producers from foreign competition or artificially stimulate exports 
of particular domestic products. This definition excludes restrictive private 
business practices. The critical issue for such a definition is whether there is 
equal market access for domestic and foreign products. If such market access 
5. 19 U.S.C. U 160-73 (1976). 
6. Efforts to erect and to avoid obstruction to trade have been in existence since ancient times. 
In 416 B.C., for example, Athens attempted to control all Aegean commerce in flax, pitch, wax, 
rope and copper and iron in order to prevent this trade from reaching Macedonia. In 407 B.C., 
Carthage imposed an agreement on the then infant Roman state limiting Rome's trade to the 
Western Mediterranean, .thus keeping the rich Eastern trade for the Carthaginians. The Punic 
Wars between Rome and Carthage beginning about 250 years later were largely over these trade 
problems. See generally U . S. TARIFF COMMISSION. TRADE BARRIERS 37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
TRADE BARRIERS]. 
7. Set D. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 43 (1974). Potential 
world income is that level attainable if resources and output are allocated in an economically effi-
cient manner. Productive resources and goods and services are efficiently allocated if they cannot 
be redistributed in such a way that some individuals will be better off and none will suffer. Id. 
8. Surprisingly enough, this definition was suggested by the National Association of Manufac-
turers, an organization that would seem to be concerned with promoting a specific and practical 
definition rather than a broad, quasi-philosophical definition. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
MANUFACTURERS, THE MANY FACES OF NONTARIFF BARRIERS (1974). 
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is equally available, then discrimination does not exist and neither does a trade 
barrier. 9 
The United States Tariff Commission1o previously concluded that a trade 
barrier simply consisted of some undesirable or unacceptable constraint upon 
the international exchange of goods. II The Commission further concluded 
that the specific definition of a trade barrier depends largely upon the point of 
view of the individual involved, as well as the political, economic, and social 
context in which the problem is being considered. 12 Based on an extensive 
survey of United States business interests, the Commission later revised its 
findings and issued an operational definition of trade barriers: virtually any 
policy, action, or arrangement, whether governmental or nongovernmental 
and regardless of purpose, that increases the cost of delivering a product in a 
market, or lowers a competitor's cost, or otherwise in any manner lessens the 
ability of businesses to sell and compete in foreign markets. 13 
B. Nontariff Barriers 
Nontariff Barriers have been defined as "any governmental or private 
regulation, practice or policy other than an ordinary custom duty, that in-
terferes with a normal conduct of trade and tends to distort the volume, com-
position, or direction of trade flow." a In its broadest use, the term non tariff 
9. Thus, an extremely burdensome or punitive tax would not be classified as a trade barrier if 
it applied indiscriminately to both domestic and imported goods. TRADE BARRIERS. supra note 6, 
at 39. 
10. The name of this agency was changed to the International Trade Commission by the 
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. S 2231(a) (1976). 
11. TRADE BARRIERS. supra note 6, at 41. 
12. /d. at 42. A trade official in a centrally-planned socialist economy, for example, would give 
an entirely different definition of trade barriers than a businessman in the United States. A 
businessman in Western Europe would find acceptable and "normal" contraints which his 
counterpart in the United States would not, and vice versa; and the viewpoint ofthe businessman 
in Japan would probably differ from both his American and European counterparts. Moreover, 
the views of all are likely to change over time. For example, U.S. producers today accept almost 
without question numerous governmental regulations and controls upon the quality, design or 
content of their products. Only thirty years ago these controls would have been viewed as gross 
and unnecessary governmental intrusions. Although the American producer accepts these con-
trols, the producer in a foreign country without such regulations will likely regard them as a trade 
barrier. Id. 
13. Id. at 43. 
14. /d. ch. 6 (emphasis added). See also R. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNA· 
TlONAL TRADE (1970); K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1970); 
Kelly, Nontariff Barriers, in STUDIES IN TRADE LiBERALIZATION 265-314 (B. Balassa ed. 1967); 
Wilson, Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: A Survey oj Current Problems, 18 J. PUB. L. 403 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Wilson). . 
In past GATT discussions there has been some confusion regarding the labelling of certain 
measures that lie between the rate of duty itself and the outermost peripheral administrative re-
quirements related to the collection of duties. European countries generally referred to such prac-
tices as para-tariffs. TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 6, at 38. This distinction was gradually 
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barrier would include any measure which restricts the free flow of goods in in-
ternational commerce. However, a more generally accepted definition would 
include only those measures which are intended to restrict trade. 15 The best 
example of the latter type of barrier is an import quota which limits imports of 
an item to a specified quantity. Health and safety legislation exemplifies a 
broader category, which, although enacted for entirely different motives, has 
the effect of restricting trade. A third category subsumes laws or practices 
which are necessary to a system of international trade, but create domestic 
delays or uncertainties which deter future trading attempts. 16 An example of 
this type of nontariff barrier is a customs classification system which is too 
complex to allow an importer to determine the rate of duty for a particular 
item prior to importation. 
A GATT committee has identified 276 nontariff barriers currently in useY 
These were grouped into five basic categories: government participation in 
trade; customs and administrative procedure; specific limitation of imports 
and exports; restraint on imports and exports by price mechanisms; and 
'other' restraints. IS 
The International Trade Commission (ITC) has developed a list of 4-7 non-
tariff barriers which it grouped into 6 basic categories: quantitative restrictions 
and specific limitation, including quotas, embargos and licensing re-
quirements; nontariff charges on imports, including border taxes and excise 
taxes; government participation in trade, including subsidies, government 
monopolies and government procurement standards, including health, safety 
and industrial standards; customs procedures and administrative practices, in-
cluding antidumping and countervailing duties; and discriminatory ocean 
freight rates. 19 
The recent increase in public concern over nontariffbarriers has led some to 
believe that the barriers are recent innovations being utilized with increasing 
regularity by governments around the world. This is not true. Only the term 
'nontariff barrier' is relatively new to popular usage. 20 Several developments 
have contributed to this increased public awareness and attention. The most 
important of these developments has been the progressive reduction of most 
tariffs in the major trading nations over the past 25 years. This had lead to the 
implementation of other types of limitations or controls upon international 
dropped and during the Kennedy Round of negotiations everything other than the actual rate of 
duty was characterized as nontariff barriers. ]d. 
15. Wilson, supra note 14, at 404. 
16. ]d. 
17. Non-tariff Trade Barriers, 121 EUROPEAN COMM. BULL. 14 (1969). 
18. Id. 
19. TARIFF BARRIERS. supra note 6, at 11. 
20. The first major antidumping statute was passed by Canada in 1904. See An Act To Amend 
the Customs Tariff of 1897,1904,4 Edw. 7, c. 11 (Can.). 
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trade. Consequently, these other controls are more useful and appear to be 
more important than before when high tariffs were the major limitation upon 
free trade. Other developments leading to the increased awareness of nontariff 
barriers include the enormous increase in world trade and a concommitant in-
crease in government participation in, and regulation of, such trade. 
1. Dumping 
Dumping is the practice of selling goods in an export market at prices below 
those prevailing in the home market. It is sometimes referred to as price 
discrimination between national markets. 21 From the turn of the century to 
the present, the international trading community uniformly has regarded 
dumping as a distortion of natural trade patterns. 22 Accordingly, the nations 
of the Western trading world and Japan have enacted antidumping laws. The 
function of these laws is to raise the dumped price to the home market value. 
The antidumping duty is imposed in addition to any tariff otherwise ap-
plicable. 23 
Dumping has been traced to 16th century Elizabethan England when 
foreigners were charged with selling paper at a loss to prevent the rise of the 
new British paper industry. U Concern over price discrimination by private 
firms in foreign markets became a more heated issue after the Industrial 
Revolution made large scale production of goods possible. Industrialization 
led to the development of cartels in Europe and trusts in America, which in 
turn fostered greater trade protectionism. Between 1890-1914, it was a com-
mon practice for German cartels, protected at home by high tariffs, to charge 
lower prices for exported goods than for goods domestically consumed. 25 Dur-
ing this same period the United States began to dump steel products and 
heavy machinery in Europe, Canada and the British colonies. 26 
The international trading community initially sought to control dumping 
through international agreements condemning the practice. These agreements 
placed the duty of prevention on the exporter's home governmentY In 1904, 
Canada became the first country to assess a special duty against dumped im-
21. J. VINER. DuMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923) [hereinafter cited as 
VINER). 
22. TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 6, ch. 6, at 1. 
23. It should be noted that although dumping is considered a distortion oftrade, antidumping 
duties are considered a nontariffbarrier to trade. This is mainly because of the utilization of non-
tariff barriers to provide additional protection for domestic industry, rather than just to correct 
an unfair trade practice. Moreover, time-consuming administrative practices and abrupt and ar-
bitrary applications of the duties increase their effectiveness. [d. 
24. VINER, supra note 21, at 374. 
25. [d. at 51-56. 
26. [d. at 88-90. 
27. Set, t.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS WORLD EcONOMIC CONFERENCE, EcON. & FIN.: REPORT 
AND PROCEEDINGS (1927). 
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ports. 28 Similar legislation was passed in New Zealand in 190529 and in the 
Union of South Africa in 1914.30 During the post World War I period, an-
tidumping laws were enacted in the United States and Europe, prompted by 
the protectionist fears of ruinous German dumping. In 1916, the United 
States appended two sections to the Revenue Act which effectively extended 
the anti-price discrimination provisions of the 1914 Clayton Act to foreign 
commerce. 31 In 1921, antidumping duties were statutorily levied on dumped 
imports by the United States,32 Australia," and Great Britain." By 1958, vir-
tually all of the major trading nations had enacted antidumping provisions in 
one form or another. 
2. Economic Aspects of Nontariff Trade Barriers. 
The motivation for dumping is that the discriminating company can max-
imize its profits by charging different prices for essentially identical products. 
A similar rationale motivates price discrimination within a domestic market. 
Profit maximization under this scheme is furthered by the fact that dumping 
promotes a sectorization of markets. This allows goods to be sold to the low-
price customers without sacrificing the benefits to be obtained from the high-
price customers. 35 In general, profit maximization resulting from dumping 
will depend on three factors: 1) the demand for the firm's product in its own 
country and abroad; 2) the barriers available to prevent reentry into the home 
market; and 3) the nature of the company's cost structure. 36 Thus, the firm 
will be more likely to profit from dumping if the demand for the goods in the 
home market is not elastic, while the demand for the goods in the export 
market is relatively elastic.37 If a company can take advantage of barriers 
designed to prevent the re-importation of the dumped products from foreign 
countries back into the company's home market, there is no need for concern 
28. An Act to Amend the Customs Tariff of 1897.1904.4 Edw. 7. c. 11 (Can.). 
29. The Agricultural Implement Manufacture. Importation and Sale Act. 1905. 5 Edw. 7. 
No. 58 (N.Z.). 
30. Act of July 7. 1914. Concerning the Imposition of Customs Duties. No. 26. § 8 (S. Africa). 
31. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463. § 800, 39 Stat. 798 (1916) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 
71 (1976». 
32. Antidumping Act. 1921.42 Stat. 11. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1976). 
33. Customs Tariff (Industries Preservation) Act. 1921, ACTS AUSTL. P. No. 28 (1921). 
34. Safeguarding ofIndustries Act, 1921. 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 47 (1921). 
35. Dejong, The Signijicaru:e of Dumping in InternDlioMl Trade, 2J.W.T.L. 162. 168 [hereinafter 
cited as Dejong]. 
36. Fisher, The Antidumping Law of lhe Unaed Slates: A Legal and Economic AMlysis, 5 LAw & 
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fisher]. 
37. The economic theory behind this proposition is one of the basic supply and demand. If de-
mand for the product in the home market can be maintained when the dumping company raises 
its prices and if the demand for the goods increases sharply by foreigners responding to lowered 
prices in their own markets, the company's profits will necessarily be maximized. /d. at 87. 
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that the home market would be ruined for the discriminating firm. 38 Finally, it 
is highly unlikely that a firm will engage in dumping unless the marginal 
revenue that it derives from foreign markets is substantially greater than its 
marginal costs of production for the dumped goods. 39 In order for this situa-
tion to occur, products must be produced at a decreasing marginal cost, I.e., 
where production is based on economies of scale.+o 
a. Economic Effects of Dumping on the Importing Country 
The most severe effects of dumping are usually felt by competing producers 
of like goods in the country of importation. Economic harm to the affected 
competitor can be measured in terms of actual present injury, or the quantity 
of dumped goods multiplied by the margin of dumping. +1 The economic ef-
fects of dumping can also be measured in terms of implied injury. 42 Using this 
38. The typical situation might be where a company in the United States buys the dumped 
goods and attempts to re-sell them in the higher priced market of the exporting country. Barriers 
to reimportation such as tariffs, quotas and other nontariff barriers will effectively protect the 
dumping firm from this type of threat. /d. 
39. VINER. supra note 21, at 94-101. 
40. Three separate types of dumping have been attributed to the concepts involved in 
marginal costs. They are: 1) sporadic dumping; 2) intermittent dumping; and 3) persistent 
dumping. VINER, supra note 21, at 94. Sporadic dumping is typically the unloading of overstock 
by a producer who prefers to dump his goods in a foreign market rather than endanger his 
domestic price structure. /d. at 23. It is of relatively little concern to the country dumped on. In-
tercommitment dumping involves an intent on the part of the producer to gain a foothold in the 
foreign market and eventually to eliminate competition in that market by selling at below 
marginal cost for brief periods. Id. at 26. After the foreign competitors are eliminated, the 
predatory dumper raises his prices above marginal cost. This practice has also been referred to as 
predatory dumping. Id. Persistent dumping involves a deliberate overproduction of merchandise 
at decreasing marginal costs. /d. The dumper has a continuous overstock which is then continual-
ly dumped in the foreign market. In these situations the firm may even be able to pass along the 
benefits of dumping to its home customers in the form of reduced prices. In practice however, the 
interests of the company and consumers are usually in opposition to each other with the company 
choosing to retain all its profits. Fisher, supra note 36, at 89. 
In general, legal writers have seldom been willing to undertake the thorough economic analysis 
of the underlying motivations for dumping necessary to an understanding of why and to what ex-
tent the practice should be regulated. For exceptions, see Anthony, The American Response to Dump-
ing From Capitalist and Socialist EcotlOl1lUS - Substantive Premises and Restructured Procedures After the 
1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159 (1969); Note, The Antidumping Act - Tariff or Antitrust 
Law?, 74 YALE L. J. 707 (1965). For a contrary analysis, s« Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers 
to Trade - The United Stales and the International Anlidumping Code, 57 CoRNELL L. REv. 491 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Barcelo), and K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION (1970). 
41. Under these situations, if a foreign company increased its share of the United States 
market by five percent through less than fair value (L TFV) sales, domestic industries producing 
like products would suffer a corresponding loss. See VINER, supra note 21, at 375. 
42. A typical example of an implied injury would be as follows: a foreign company holds 15 
percent of the domestic market in a given product both before and after the sale by that country of 
the product at L TFV sales, there is an implied injury to the domestic competitors to the extent of 
lost market opportunities. See Fisher, supra note 36, at 90. 
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analysis, the effects of dumping can be assessed by the amount of growth that 
would have taken place in the competing industry had no dumping occurred 
or, by the harm suffered by domestic industries which manufacture products 
that are not directly competitive with the dumped imports,43 or by the harm 
occurring to the user industries in the importing country. 44 
Most economic analyses of dumping fail to consider the potential benefits 
that may accrue to the importing country. The primary benefit is in the form 
of lower consumer prices for the dumped goods. In certain situations, the sav-
ings to the consumers can be substantial and relatively non-injurious to the en-
tire economy. +5 Thus, if a domestic industry can adjust to the effect of dump-
ing, the importing country may realize the net benefit from the increased effi-
ciency and lower prices provided by the dumping. However, if the dumping 
also produces substantial inventory buildups or increases in unemployment, 
any benefits of dumping will be rendered nugatory. 
This balancing test of injuries versus benefits has been incorporated into the 
antidumping laws which have adopted a material injury test. Since a domestic 
manufacturer must prove material injury as a prerequisite to the assessment of 
antidumping duties, the law automatically allows the beneficial aspects of 
dumping to permeate the economy up to the point that the benefits are 
outweighed by material harm to a domestic industry. 46 
b. Economic Effects of Dumping on the Exporting Country 
As previously discussed, generally a firm in the exporting country will profit 
from dumpingY Whether the exporting country itself will derive a benefit 
from dumping is another question. 48 In cases where the dumped goods are be-
ing produced at declining marginal costs, consumers in the dumping country 
43. Economic harm in this situation arises because domestic consumers are tempted to pur-
chase the dumped goods rather than the nondirectIy competitive domestic goods. A typical exam-
ple would be a situation in which the exporting country dumps television sets but not radios. 
Depending upon the relevant cross-elasticities of demand, the L TFV television sets will deflect. 
consumer preferences away from radios in many instances and thus harm the domestic radio in-
dustry and the television industry. [d. at 91. 
44. User industries which are unaware of the source oflower priced imports can be rendered 
dysfunctional if they have based their future cost and price determinations on a continuing supply 
of the dumped goods and such supply is terminated with no advance warning. [d. 
45. Where dumping is sporadic, it has been suggested that the benefits oflower prices usually 
outweigh the marginal harm suffered by local industries. See Ehrenhaft, Protection Against Interna-
tional Price Discrimination: United Stales Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 
47 (1958). However, where dumping is intermittent or predatory, the substantial injury suffered 
by local industries usually outweighs the benefits resulting from lower consumer prices. Id. BuJ see 
Barcelo, supra note 40. 
46. For a complete discussion of the United States antidumping law and the material injury 
test, s« S IV. E infra. 
47. The necessary ingredients for making dumping profitable to an exporting firm are dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 27-31 supra. 
48. See generally Fisher, supra note 36, at 89. 
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may realize lower prices if the firm passes along its increased profits.49 How-
ever, if the goods are produced at increasing marginal costs, consuml!r prices 
in the exporting country will rise as the dumping firm compensates for 
relatively unprofitable foreign dumping. 50 
c. Economic Effects of Dumping on Third Countries 
One of the most compelling arguments for proscribing dumping is its per-
nicious effects on 'innocent' third countries. Producers of like products in 
third countries that are not dumped will suffer the same economic harm as 
domestic producers face when they attempt to compete with dumped goods in 
the country of importation: as demand for their products declines, inventories 
build, prices drop and profits disappear. 51 Unlike firms in the importing coun-
try, firms in third countries will never receive any of the ancillary benefits 
from dumping, such as lower consumer prices. Thus, the economics of dump-
ing have far reaching implications, some of which may transcend the Im-
mediate parties to threaten entire networks of trading partners. 
III. ELIMINATING NONTARIFF BARRIERS: 
THE TOKYO ROUND AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 
The concern over dumping is no longer expressed in terms of its pernicious 
economic effects; instead concern is generated over the unfettered use of an-
tidumping duties to remedy dumping. 52 Following this analysis, antidumping 
duties are considered the real nontariff trade barrier rather than the underly-
ing sales at less than fair value (LTFV). The reason for this is simple: the 
duties have been used to provide an added measure of protection for domestic 
industries, rather than to correct an unfair trade practice. Equally important, 
are the inefficient administrative practices and the abrupt and arbitrary ap-
plications of duties, that have made them a greater hindrance to free trade 
than dumping itself. 
A. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Since the GAIT was signed in 1947,53 there have been periodic rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTN).54 These rounds have attempted to im-
49. Dejong, supra note 35, at 170. 
50. /d. 
51. See Fisher, supra note 36, at 92. 
52. See, e.g., GATT Doc. ADIW/90 2 (1979). 
53. Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. pt. 5, at All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 V.N.T.S. 194 (1950). 
54. Six previous rounds of MTN have taken place between the GATT contracting parties. 
These rounds have been labeled as follows: Geneva Round, 1947; Annecy Rounds, 1949; Tor-
quay Round, 1950; Japanese Accession to the GATT, 1955; Dillon Round, 1960; and Kennedy 
round, 1964. See generally TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 6. 
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plement the declared intent of the original Agreement: to reduce tariffs be-
tween the contracting parties. These MTNs have substantially achieved their 
purpose. 55 However, the significant tariff reductions negotiated during these 
rounds did not affect the use of non tariff barriers. The effect of these nontariff 
barriers became more obvious as tariffs dropped to lower and lower levels. 
Moreover, the use of nontariff barriers by developed countries made it in-
creasingly difficult for less developed countries to achieve any meaningful ac-
cess to their markets. 56 
In September 1973, the Ministers of more than 100 countries initiated the 
Tokyo Round57 of trade negotiations with the intent of reducing or 
eliminating nontariff barriers which imposed such restraints on an effective 
system of international discipline. 58 
B. United States Participation in the Tokyo Round 
United States involvement in the Tokyo Round came about as a result of an 
infrequently used constitutional arrangement. The power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations is specifically delegated to Congress. 59 However, 
Congress has sometimes delegated this authority to the President. 60 The 
Trade Act of 197461 authorized the President to enter into the already 
launched Tokyo Round of trade negotiations for the purpose of establishing 
fairness and equity in international trading relations. The trade discussions in-
cluded: the reform of rules governing international trade and the harmoniza-
tion, reduction, and elimination of tariff and non tariff barriers to interna-
55. The following figures represent a percent of reduction in average tariff levels on industrial 
products as a result ofthe six previous rounds of negotiations: United States - 72.1; Canada-
58.2; Japan - 25.0; European Community - 44.3; United Kingdom - 59.6. /d. at 9. 
56. See generaUy D. CLINE, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TOKYO ROUND: A QUANTITATIVE 
AsSESSMENT (1978). It should be noted that developing countries were, for the most part, exclud-
ed from any tariff reductions agreed to in the Tokyo Round. /d. 
57. Although the bulk ofthe negotiations took place in Geneva, Switzerland, this round of in-
ternational trade talks was named for the ministerial conference which launched them in Tokyo, 
Japan.ld. 
58. GA'IT Doc. MTN/NTM/W 1236, (1979). Nontariffbarriers are more difficult to negotiate 
than are tariff reductions. It has been suggested that this is due to at least three factors: 1) their 
complexity and subtlety, requiring a high degree of expertise even to identify the practices which 
might operate as nontariff barriers; 2) the difficulty of appraising the effect or concrete impact on 
trade, of either a nontariff barrier or an international rule regarding a nontariff barrier, thus 
making it difficult for national representatives at a negotiation to evaluate the "quid pro quo" or 
reciprocal balance of any set of obligations; and 3) the divergence of governmental and economic 
philosophies represented at the bargaining conference, such as to render it impossible to reach 
agreement on fundamental goals or assumptions. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE. 96TH CONGo 1ST 
SESS., MTN AND THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE I, S. Doc. No. CP 96-14-
(Comm. Print 1979). 
59. U.S. CONST.art I, S 8, cl. 3. 
60. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. S 1801 (1976). 
61. 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U .S.C.). 
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tional trade. Another goal was to assure the United States of equal competitive 
opportunities in foreign markets. 62 
The Act authorized the President to negotiate trade agreements providing 
for the reduction and elimination of non tariff barriers and other distortions of 
international trade, subject to procedures for the approval and implementa-
tion of such agreements by Congress.63 The procedures set forth in the Act in-
cluded amendments to the rules of the House and the Senate insuring con-
sideration of the implementing legislation. 64 The Act also stated that the im-
plementing legislation could not be amended once it was submitted to Con-
gress by the President. 65 The President's apparent discretion was substantially 
mitigated by the Act's requirement for close consultation with the Congress. 
The President was required to consult with the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, the Senate Committee on Finance, and all other committees in 
both Houses exercising jurisdiction over any subject matter which would be 
affected by the trade agreements.66 
C. The Results 
The Tokyo Round concluded on April 12, 1979 with the parties signing the 
agreements in Geneva. The agreements are comprised of codes which cover 
the following areas: subsidies and countervailing measures; antidumping 
measures; customs valuation; government procurement; technical barriers to 
trade; import licensing procedures; trade in civil aircraft; international dairy 
arrangements; bovine meat arrangements; and a group framework according 
more favorable treatment to developing countries. 67 This Recent Develop-
62. Id. S 2, 19 U.S.C. S 2102 (1976). 
63. /d. S 102, 19 U.S.C. S 2112 (1976). 
64. Special legislative procedures are established under n 151 and 152 of the Trade Act of 
1974,19 U.S.C. n 2191,2192 (1976), for insuring consideration of the implementing legisla-
tion. 
65. Id. S 102(d), 19 U.S.C. S 2112(d) (1976). This provision was enacted to avoid certain 
problems that arose after the Kennedy Round. The United States had been urged for some time 
to drop its American Selling Price System of customs valuation on certain imports. It agreed to 
this during the Kennedy Round but Congress did not ultimately approve the agreement. Fur-
ther, a dispute between the Congress and the Executive branch on the International Antidump-
ing Code and its relation to the domestic Antidumping Act convinced the Contracting Parties 
that previous negotiating procedures were futile if United States negotiators could not make com-
mitments they were sure the Congress would both accept and implement in domestic law. See 
generally Pintos & Murphy, Congress Dumps the Inleml.ltional Antidumping Code, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 
180 (1968). 
The no-amendment provision also resulted in some rather high-intensity lobbying before the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was submitted for Congressional approval. See generally Glenn, 
Negotiating the Trade Pact at Home and Abroad, NAT'L J. March 17, 1979, at 429. 
66. Trade Act of 1974, § 102(c), 19 U.S.C. S 2112(c) (1976). For a detailed description of the 
consultations that took place between the Carter Administration and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, see S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979). 
67. The entire set of codes are contained in HOUSE COMM.ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE 
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ment will only deal with the antidumping agreements. The agreements con-
cerning the imposition of antidumping duties68 are a re-codification of the old 
International Antidumping Code.69 The Agreements call for the imposition of 
antidumping duties only after there is a finding of material injury to a 
domestic industry resulting from dumping. 70 In addition, certain procedures 
are established that insure the "speedy, effective and equitable" imposition of 
antidumping duties. 71 A dispute settlement mechanism is also included. 72 The 
Agreement makes no attempt to condemn dumping itself. Rather, the aim is 
to curb the protectionist application of antidumping laws. 73 In the United 
States, the implementing legislation for the agreements entered into in Geneva 
was the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Act of 1979). 
D. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
The Trade Act of 19797f approves and implements the trade agreements 
negotiated by the United States in the Tokyo Round ofthe MTN. Pursuant to 
the Trade Act of 1974/5 the bill was developed in close consultation among 
the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Subcom: 
mittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate 
Finance Committee and other interested committees of the two Houses. 
The Act contains eleven titles, most of which implement a given provision 
of the MTN. For example, Title I of the Act is entitled "Countervailing and 
Antidumping Duties' '76 and corresponds to the MTN agreements concerning 
CoMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. WMCP 
96-18 (Comm. Print 1979). 
68. See Proposed Revision of the Agreement on Implementation of Anicle VI, GATT Doc. 
ADIW/90 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping Agreement). 
69. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, opened/or sigMtu" June 30, 1967, 
19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (effective July 1,1968). For a discussion of this agreement, . 
Sll note 94 infra. 
70. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 68, an. 2. 
71. Id. arts. 5, 8 and 10. For a discussion ofthese procedures and how the United States has 
incorporated them in its domestic law, Sll S IV infra. 
72. Antidumping Agreement, sU/Jra note 68, art. 15. 
73. Id. art. 1. 
74. Pub. L. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A.). The bill, H.R. 
4537, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONGo REC. H4, 765 (daily ed.June 19,1979), was submitted to 
Congress by the President on June 19, 1979, where it was referred to the House Committee on 
Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. Each Committee issued a repon 
wherein the bill was supponed without change. See H. REp. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979), and S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979). The bill became law on July 26, 
1979. 
75. See also S m.B sU/Jra. 
76. The changes in United States antidumping practices as a result of the Act are discussed in 
S IV infro.. Subtitle A of Title I implements new procedures in the assessment and imposition of 
countervailing duties. In a major departure from prior countervailing duty law, the Act now per-
mits the Secretary of the Treasury to impose countervailing duties on subsidized products only if 
the ITC determines that a domestic industry is being materially injured by such subsidized im-
pons. See gnuraJly S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
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those issues. 77 Title X on Judicial Review and Title XI concerning 
miscellaneous provisions do not implement specific MTN agreements, but 
rather clarify domestic procedures in these various areas. 78 
IV. UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAWS 
A. History 
The first legislative attempt to deal with the problem of dumped goods was 
section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916.19 At the end of World War I, the 
Wilson Aaministration feared that European cartels would attempt to destroy 
their smaller American competitors.8o The 1916 Act was enacted to prevent 
unfair competition. The statute was directed at importers or "those assisting 
in importing" articles into the U. S. 
at a price substantially less than the actual market value or 
wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the 
U.S., in the principal markets of the country of their production 
. . . with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the 
United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in 
the United States ... 81 
The statute, however, has never been invoked because of its vagueness. There 
has been no settled interpretation of who is included in the phrase "a person 
importing or assisting in importing,' '82 and what degree of similarity between 
articles sold in the home country markets and those sold in the U.S. must be 
established.83 
Because of the difficulties of proof under the 1916 Act, and in response to 
complaints by American manufacturers that there was a flood of dumped im-
ports on the American market, Congress enacted the Antidumping Act, 
1921.84 Generally, the Antidumping Act, 1921 required a determination by 
77. See GATT Doc. MTN/NTMIW1236 (1979), and Antidumping Agreement, supra note 68. 
The other titles of the Act of 1979 which implement specific MTN agreements are as follows: Ti-
tle II Customs Valuation; Title III Government Procurement; Title IV Technical Barriers to 
Trade (Standards); Title V Implementation of Tariff Schedules; Title VI Civil Aircraft 
Agreements; and Title VIII Treatment of Distilled Spirits. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). 
78. See S IV.F irifra for a discussion of judicial review of newly created antidumping pro-
cedures. Title XI on miscellaneous provisions contains a requirement that the President submit 
to Congress a plan for the restructuring of the Executive branch foreign trade policy-making and 
regulatory functions. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,93 Stat. 144. 
79. 15 U.S.C. S 72 (1976). 
80. See Myerson, A Review of Cu"mt Antidumping Procedures: United States Law and the Case of 
Japan, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 173-74 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Myerson]. 
81. 15 U.S.C. S 72 (1976). 
82. Myerson, sUJn'a note 80, at 173. 
83. [d. 
84. S 201,19 U.S.C. S 160 (1976). 
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the Treasury Department (Treasury) as to whether a certain class of goods was 
being, or was likely to be, sold at LTFV.85 If the finding by Treasury was af-
firmative, customs appraisement was withheld86 and the case was turned over 
to the United States Tariff Commission87 to determine whether there was, or 
was likely to be, injury to an American industry.88 The Commission then con-
ducted an investigation into the question of injury. 89 If an affirmative finding 
was reached, the case was returned to Treasury where the Secretary of the 
Treasury assessed a duty on the goods equal to the dumping margin.90 This 
assessment was in addition to any duties otherwise applicable. 
The latest modifications in United States antidumping laws are contained in 
the Act of 1979.91 Title I of the Act of 1979 provides for the repeal of the An-
tidumping Act, 1921 and the enactment of a new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 
1930 (Act of 1930).92 The Act implements some substantive and several pro-
cedural changes in United States law. 
Under the new law, antidumping duties are imposed when the administer-
ing authority (presently the Secretary of the Treasury) determines that a class 
or kind of merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at 
LTFV and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that 
an industry in the United States is materially injured, threatened with 
material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, 




One of the primary substantive changes made by the Act is the inclusion of 
a material injury test as a prerequisite to the assessment of antidumping 
duties. This was the standard that all member nations of GATT, except the 
85. Id. 
86. Id.S 201(b), 19 U.S.C. S 160(bXIXB) (1976). 
87. See note 10 supra. 
88. In 1954 the Antidumping Act, 1921 was amended so that the International Trade Com-
mission, which was considered to have a certain expertise in such areas, would determine injury. 
Customs Simplification Act of 1954,68 Stat. 1136 (1954) (current version at 19 U.S.C. S 160 
(1976». 
89. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(a), 19 U.S.C. S 160(a) (1976). 
90. 19 C.F.R. S 153.43 (1977). 
91. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
92. 19 U.S.C. SS 1202-1654 (1976). References to the antidumping provisions of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 will be referenced to the appropriate section of Title VII of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 unless otherwise indicated. 
93. Tariff Act of 1930, S 731, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673 (Supp. 1979). 
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United States, had applied under the International Antidumping Code. 94 The 
basic structure of this Code and most of its provisions were left unchanged by 
the MTN.95 
'Material Injury' is defined in the new provisions of the Act of 1930 as 
"harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. "96 In mak-
ing its injury determinations, the ITC is required to consider, inter alia, the 
volume of imports of the merchandise under question, the effect of such im-
ports on United States prices oflike products, and the impact of such imports 
on domestic producers. 97 
In its evaluation of the first factor, the ITC is to consider whether the ex-
isting volume of imports, or an increase in the volume of the imports, is 
significant. 98 In evaluating any price effect, the ITC must consider whether 
94. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, June 30,1967,19 U.S.T. 4348, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (effective July 1,1978) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping Code). The An-
tidumping Code was negotiated as an agreement to the elaborate provisions of Article VI of 
GATT, and concerned itself solely with curbing the protectionist application of antidumping 
laws. /d. art. 1. No attempt was made to condemn dumping itself. The Code had three major ob-
jectives: 1) to reduce the harassment value of antidumping proceedings; 2) to reduce the penal 
nature of provisional and final remedies; and 3) to ensure procedural fairness. /d. The Code 
sought to implement the first objective by requiring government officials to have evidence of both 
dumping and injury before they initiated any investigation. Id. art 5(a). This requirement pro-
tected foreign competition from harrassment by complainants who based their complaint on the 
basis of either dumping or injury. The Code required simultaneous investigations of both dump-
ing and injury. Id. By allowing provisional remedies to be assessed against goods under investiga-
tion only if there had been an affirmative preliminary decision of dumping and if there was some 
evidence of injury on hand, the Code sought to implement the second objective of reducing the 
penal nature of provisional and final remedies. /d. 
Procedural openness was ensured by the Code's requirement that both the foreign supplier and 
the local importer be given notice of the initiation of antidumping proceedings and that they be 
given a chance to present written evidence. /d. art. 6. 
The Code also set standards restricting the protectionist interpretation of substantive aspects of 
dumping laws. In its definition of "industry" the Code included only like products in the 
domestic market. A "like product" was defined as a product "identical, that is alike in all 
respects to the dumped product under consideration." Id. art. 2(b). 
The Code's standard for injury was a "material" injury. /d. art. 3(a). While the term 
"material" was not specifically defined, factors such as market share, profits, employment and 
utilization of capacity were all relevant in determining whether an injury was material. /d. 
Finally, in order to ensure that there was a proper nexus between dumping and injury, the 
Code provided that dumped imports must be the principal cause of domestic injury. /d. art. 3(a). 
Reluctant to change the procedures established by the 1921 Antidumping Act, Congress 
declared that the provisions of the Code could be considered law in the United States so long as 
they did not conflict with domestic law, and did not limit the discretion of the ITC in its injury 
determination function. See Renegotiation Amendment Act of 1968, 19 U.S.C. S 160 (1976). The 
overall effect of Congress' action was to render the International Antidumping code inapplicable 
to issues of dumping in the United States. See gtnn'ally Barcelo, supra note 40; Pintos & Murphy, 
supra note 65; Long, United States Law and the International Antidumping Code, 3 INT'L LAw. 464 
(1969). 
95. Compare Antidumping Code, supra note 94, with Antidumping Agreement, supra note 68. 
96. Tariff Act of 1930, S 771(7XA), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(7)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
97. /d. U 77l(7XBXi), (ii), (iii), 19 U.S.C.A. U 1677(7XBXi), (ii), (iii) (Supp. 1979). 
98. /d. S 77l(7)(CXi), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(7XC)(i) (Supp. 1979). 
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domestic prices are being significantly undercut or suppressed. 99 Likewise, the 
new provisions direct the ITC to consider all relevant economic factors in 
assessing the impact of the dumped goods on the domestic industry .100 Some 
of these economic factors are listed in the 1979 Act itself: 1) actual and poten-
tial decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on in-
vestments, and under utilization of capacity; 101 and 2) actual and potential 
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, and 
ability to raise capital. 102 
However, there are significant problems in the application of the new Act. 
The statutory requirements provide ambivalent guidance for the ITC in its in-
jury determinations. Obviously, the significance of various economic factors is 
dependent upon the facts of each case. The House Ways and Means Commit-
tee recognized this point by stating that "Neither the presence nor absence of 
any factor listed in the [Act] can necessarily give decisive guidance with 
respect to an injury determination." 103 The complex economic, political and 
even sociological and psychological issues that surround certain industries 
make it imperative for the ITC to have a free hand in determining injury in 
particular cases. Thus, in one industry, a small volume of imports may have a 
significant impact on the market, while in another the same volume might not 
be significant. Likewise, for one type of product price may be the key factor in 
determining sales elasticity, with a rise in the amount of dumping having a 
decisive effect. The dumping margin may have no impact on other products. 
While it does not advance any additional injury guidelines, the House Ways 
and Means Committee did state that recent ITC injury determinations have 
been consistent with a material injury standard. l04 
b. Causation 
Sales at L TFV must be a cause of material injury before dumping duties 
can be assessed. The Act of 1979 contains the same causation element as prior 
law: material injury must be "by reason of' the L TFV imports. lOS Under the 
Antidumping Act, 1921,106 the causation standard ranged from a "con-
99. Id. S 771(7XCXii), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(7XCXii) (Supp. 1979). 
100. Id. S 771(7)(CXiii), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677ft7)(C)(iii) (Supp. 1979). 
101. Id. S 771(7)(CXiiiXI), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(7XC)(iii)(I) (Supp'. 1979). 
102. Id. S 771(7XCXiii)(III), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(7XCXiii)(III) (Supp. 1979). With respect to 
argicultural products, the ITC must also consider any increased burden on government income 
or price support programs. /d. S 771(7)(DXii), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(7XDXii) (Supp. 1979). 
103. H. REp. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 46 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE 
REPORT]. 
104. Id. 
105. Compa" Tariff Act of 1930, S 731(2XB), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673(2XB) (Supp. 1979) with An-
tidumping Act, 1921, 19 U.S.C. S 160 (1976). 
106. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201, 19 U.S.C. S 160 (1976). 
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tributing cause" of injury to a finding of "mere contribution" to injury.107 
More recently, the standard required that L TFV sales must have caused more 
than a de minimis part of the entire injury, but the relationship between 
L TFV sales and injury need only have been identifiable. lOB 
In evaluating the causation element, i.e., whether material injury is "by 
reason of' imports being sold at L TFV, the ITC examines the effects of such 
imports on the domestic industry. However, the ITC does not consider the ef-
fects of such factors as contraction in demand or changes in patterns of con-
sumption, on a domestic injury .109 If the ITC were to examine the causation 
issue in light of these other factors, relief would become more difficult to ob-
tain for those industries facing a variety of problems. These same industries 
are the most vulnerable to dumped imports. l1o 
c. Threat of Injury 
The Act of 1930 provides for relief if the ITC determines that an industry is 
being threatened with material injury by reason of dumped imports. III This 
provision is intended to permit relief before actual material injury occurs, as 
well as to prevent actual injury from occurring. 
The House Ways and Means Committee has stated that an affirmative 
determination in such cases should be based upon evidence showing that the 
threat is "real and imminent and not [based] upon mere supposition or con-
jecture." 112 Thus, the ITC might look for evidence of trends, such as the rate 
of increase of the dumped goods into domestic markets, or other indications 
that a particular situation could develop into actual material injury. 113 
107. Compare Pig Iron from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the U.S.S.R., 33 
Fed. Reg. 14,664 (1968), with UNITED STATES TARIFF COMM·N. PRIMARY LEAD METAL FROM 
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 639 (1974). 
108. This standard was developed because of the lTC's practice of cumulating the injurious 
effect of dumped goods on an industry from various countries rather than measuring the effect of 
dumped goods from countries individually. See Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 
49,153 (1975). Thus, assessment of dumping duties could follow a determination by the ITC that 
the dumping of goods by a certain country was an identifiable cause of injury to a domestic in-
dustry. /d. 
109. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 47. 
110. This does not preclude the ITC from considering evidence presented to it which indicated 
that the harm attributed by a domestic interest to the dumped imports is actually attributable to 
factors such as a change in demand, a change in consumption patterns or even increased com-
petition in the market. /d. This does not imply however, that the domestic interest would bear the 
burden of providing that material injury is not caused by these other factors. See /d. 
111. Tariff Act of 1930, S 731(2XA)(ii), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673(2XA)(ii) (Supp. 1979). 
112. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 47. 
113. The Committee stresses that an increase in market penetration is an early warning signal 
of injury, and warns the ITC to be wary of the rate of increase in market penetration, particularly 
if such penetration is achieved by prices which are below United States price levels. /d. at 48. The 
Committee also states that the absence of these trends or high present utilization of capacity in 
capacity in the domestic industry should not be conclusive as to the absence of threat of material 
injury. /d. at 74. 
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2. Industry 
The new provisions of the Act of 1930 continue prior usage of the term 'in-
dustry' holding it generally to refer to all the domestic producers who produce 
products like the product subject to the investigation, or products most similar 
in characteristics and uses to the merchandise under investigation. 1I4 The 
term also includes producers whose collective output of the like product con-
stitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that prod-
uct.1I5 
Since this definition is left largely unchanged from previous law, it is useful 
to survey the lTC's past interpretations of the term. The ITC originally con-
sidered industries on a national rather than regional basis. However, the 
lTC's interpretation of 'industry' has since ranged from a national standard, 
in situations involving a single domestic producer,1I6 to a regional standard, 
where the Commission considered the effect of future sales only in a given 
geographical region. 117 The ITC extended this regional industry standard to 
the extreme case of finding injury to an industry in a case where only 5.5 per-
cent of consumption in a given area was accounted for by imports, and where 
these imports represented only 0.05 percent of national consumption. liS These 
findings reflected the attitude of the ITC that an injury to a part of the na-
tional industry was an injury to the whole industry. 119 In Titanium Spongefrom 
the U. S. S. R., 120 the ITC held that an industry was injured, but applied its find-
ing only to the sponge-producing facility of the two producers. 121 
Recently, the Commission has commenced using a definition of 'industry' 
that is quite different that its use of regional and industrial segmentation to 
measure impact. This new theory measures the impact in more than one in-
dustry simultaneously. 
This new approach aggregates injury in different industries to reach what 
114. Tariff Act of 1930, S 771(4)(A) and S 771(10), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(4)(A)(1O) (Supp. 
1979). 
115. Id. S 771(4)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(4)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
116. See Steel Jacks from Canada, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,197 (1966). 
117. In Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3,840 (1964), a determination of 
likelihood of injury to a national industry was made even though only the future effect of sales in 
the Pacific Northwest region of the United States was considered by the ITC. /d. The same 
reasoning was applied in U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMM'N, Hollow or Cored Ceramic Brick and Tile 
from Canada, U.S.I.T.C. publication 785 (1976). 
118. Steel Bars, Reinforcing Bars and Shapes from Australia, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,161 (1970). 
119. Id. at 4,162. 
120. 33 Fed. Reg. 10,769 (1968). 
121. Id. It is questionable whether in cases where only one sector of a market is being injured, 
that region only and not producers in other areas should be assisted by the levying of dumping 
duties despite the fact that the U.S. CoNST. art. I, S 8, d. 1 requires the uniform assessment of 
duties among the states. In Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 784 (Cust. Ct. 
1970), aif'd, 331 F. Supp. 1400 (Cust. Ct. 1971), the trial court held that duties must be assessed 
by the ITC on a geographically uniform basis. This question was not addressed on appeal. See 
Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
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the Commission considers to be a significant l~vel.l22 Since Congress has not 
expressed any dissatisfaction with this approach, it may be assumed that the 
ITC will continue to interpret the term 'industry' in this way under the Act of 
1979. 
3. Less Than Fair Value Sales 
The Act contains no specific definition of L TFV sales. Rather, the term in-
cludes several concepts which are separately defined in the Act. 
First, there is the situation where the purchase price, or exporter's sales 
price of an item in the United States, is less than the price at which similar 
merchandise is sold for consumption in the country of exportation. 123 Under 
prior law, a distinction between the purchase price and the exporter's sale 
price was made in contemplation of sales by a manufacturer to a related im-
porter. 124 Thus, the purchase price was used when an importer unrelated to 
the manufacturer made an arms-length purchase, the purchase price being the 
net f.o.b. factory price to the importer. 125 The exporter's sales price was used 
when the importer was related to the manufacturer either as an agent or as a 
subsidiary. 126 
The Act of 1979 provides a new term - 'United States Price ' 127 - which is 
an amalgamation of the previous terms 'purchase price' and 'exporter's sales 
price.' However, the Act of 1979 modifies the meaning of purchase price to 
mean the price at which the merchandise is purchased, or agreed to be pur-
chased, prior to the date of importation, from the manufacturer or producer of 
the merchandise for exportation to the United States. 128 The purpose of this 
change is to provide statutory authority for the administrative practice which 
uses the producer's sale price to an unrelated middleman as the purchase price 
if a producer knew that the merchandise was intended for sale to an unrelated 
purchaser in the United States under terms of sale fixed on or before the date 
of importation. 129 
122. See, e.g., Lock-In Amplifiers and Parts Thereoffrom the United Kingdom, 40 Fed. Reg. 
28,876 (1975). 
123. See 19 C.F.R. S 153.22 (1979). Where the quantity of the goods sold for consumption in 
the home market (country of exportation) is so small as to be negligible and an inadequate basis 
of comparison for the price of goods sold in the United States, then the purchase price or ex-
porter's sales price to third countries will be the basis of comparison. 19 C.F.R. S 153.3 (1979). 
124. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 204, 19 U.S.C. S 163 (1976). 
125. Id. S 203, 19 U.S.C. S 162 (1976). 
126. ]d. S 204, 19 U.S.C. S 163 (1976). 
127. See Tariff Act of 1930, U 731(2), 772(d), 19 U.S.C.A. U 1673(2), 1677a(d) (Supp. 
1979), where antidumping duties are required to be imposed in an amount equal to the amount 
by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States price for the merchandise. 
128. Id. S 772(b), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677a(b) (Supp. 1979). 
129. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 75. This provision allows the purchase price to be used 
if transactions between related parties indicate that the merchandise has been sold prior to impor-
tation to a United States buyer unrelated to the producer. 
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4: Foreign Market Value 
Foreign market value (FMV) is the term used to describe the value against 
which the United States price is compared in assessing antidumping duties. 130 
Under the Antidumping Act, 1921, the price of goods in the United States was 
compared with the FMV.131 The FMV consisted of the value of comparable 
goods sold in the exporter's home markets, third country markets, or an ar-
tificially constructed value. 132 The present Act extends the concept of FMV to 
embrace both the existing term 'FMV' and 'constructed value'. In addition, 
the Act of 1979 does away with the statutory preference for the use of third 
country prices over constructed value.133 The Secretary may now use either 
standard if the exporter's home market prices are either unavailable or inade-
quate for purposes of calculating FMV. IH 
This change is due to the problems inherent in using third country market 
prices. For example, where sales in the exporter's home market are below the 
cost of production, prior law directed the Secretary to use third country prices 
as a basis of comparison. m Frequently, however, if a producer is selling below 
cost in his home market, he will also be selling below cost in export markets. In 
these cases, the use of third country prices would not be an effective basis of 
comparison. 136 
The Act of 1979 also allows the Secretary to use generally accepted averag-
ing and sampling techniques in determining FMV.137 This provision is meant 
to ease the administrative burden of assessing antidumping duties on an entry-
by-entry basis. 138 
130. Tariff Act of 1930, SS 731(2),773, 19 U.S.C.A. SS 1673(2), 1677(b) (Supp. 1979). 
131. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 205, 19 U.S.C. S 164 (1976). 
132. Id. 'Constructive Value' is used in those situations in which the available information 
concerning the sales in the home market or to third countries is either inadequate or irrelevant, as 
in the case of state controlled economies. 19 C.F.R. S 153.7 (1979). Here, the foreign govern-
ment sets wages, material costs, sales prices and profit margins, and prices generally do not 
reflect the results of market place competition. In situations like this, the Secretary will either use 
prices at which similar merchandise of an uncontrolled economy is sold for, or he will make a 
determination of a constructed value to compare with the United States price. Id. This value is 
constructed on the basis of normal costs, expenses and profits as they are reflected in the prices of 
the same or similar merchandise sold for consumption in or by other countries. /d. 
133. Tariff Act of 1930, S 773(aX2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677b(aX2) (Supp. 1979). 
134. Id. 
135. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 205, 19 U.S.C. S 164(b) (1976). 
136. The House Ways and Means Committee has stated, however, that third country prices 
will still be preferred over constructed value if presented in a timely manner and if adequate to 
establish FMV. HOUSE REPoIlT. supra note 103, at 76. 
137. Tariff Act of 1930, S 773(4), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677(4) (Supp. 1979). 
138. Because of the potential for abuse if it is not strictly circumscribed, this provision is 
limited to those cases where the need is the greatest, e.g., cases involving a large number of sales. 
HOUSE REPOIlT, supra note 103, at 76. 
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V. PROCEDURES UNDER THE 1979 TRADE ACT 
A. Investigation 
The first step in the antidumping procedure is an investigation into the facts 
of a particular dumping situation by the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary). 
This investigation may be initiated in one of two ways: 1) by the Secretary ac-
ting on his own initiative,139 or 2) upon receipt of a petition filed on behalf of a 
domestic industry by an interested party. 140 
1. Initiation of Investigation by Secretary of Treasury 
The Secretary of Treasury is required to initiate an investigation whenever 
it is determined that such action is warranted. Such an investigation may be 
instigated by reports from district directors of Customs, who are required to 
report to the Commissioner of Customs if they are aware of any grounds for a 
reason to believe or suspect that any merchandise is being or is likely to be im-
ported into the United States at LTFV.1u While self-initiation of investiga-
tions was permissible under previous law, 142 in practice the Secretary initiated 
the investigation only upon receipt of a petition. The House Ways and Means 
Committee has expressed its dissatisfaction with this practice and has declared 
its firm intent that the self-initiation provision be implemented. 143 In view of 
this commitment to the self-initiation of investigations, the Committee stated 
that the standard to be applied in exercising the provision is less rigorous than 
the 'reasonable indication' standard which serves as the basis for a 
preliminary determination of L TFV. 144 Moreover, the Committee stressed 
139. Tariff Act of 1930, § 732(a), 19 V.S.C.A. S 1673a(a) (Supp. 1979). 
14:0. /d. § 732(b), 19 V.S.C.A. S 1673(b) (Supp. 1979). 
14:1. 19 C.F.R. S 153.25 (1979). Vnder the regulations enacted pursuant to the Antidumping 
Act, 1921, the Customs Service official in charge of the antidumping proceedings while they were 
still in the Customs stage was the "case handler". His duties included preparing and transmit-
ting a questionnaire to the parties under investigation, instructing Customs representatives about 
the supplied data and occasionally going abroad to participate in the investigation. Id. The case 
handler's main purpose was to hold a series of disclosure conferences with each of the interested 
parties at which all of the accumulated data which was not confidential was made available. 
These disclosure conferences were conducted without any formal procedural safeguards ~ no 
rules of evidence were applied and no transcript of the proceedings was issued. During the con-
ferences, the case handler submitted his tentative views concerning the disposition of the case to 
the parties. Additional disclosure conferences were held if, in response to what was learned at the 
initial conference, a party submitted additional data. At the conclusion of these conferences the 
case handler prepared a memorandum in which he recommended disposition of the case. The 
memorandum was reviewed and refined by supervisory personnel and the recommendations of 
the Customs Service were then forwarded to the Office of Tariff and Trade Affairs in tbe 
Treasury Department. See 19 C.F.R. 153.25 (1979). 
142. See Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(a), 19 V.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). 
14:3. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 59. The Committee stated that any regulation relating 
to the self-initiation provision is not to become a "dead letter." Id. 
144. Id. See also Tariff Act of 1930, § 733(b), 19 V.S.C.A. § 1673b(b) (Supp. 1979). 
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that the Secretary should not rule out an investigation simply because a 
domestic industry has not requested one.1f5 
2. Initiation of Investigation by Petition 
A preliminary investigation into an allegation of dumping may also be ini-
tiated by the Secretary upon receipt of a petition filed on behalf of domestic in-
dustry by an interested party. 146 The petition must allege that imports are be-
ing or are likely to be sold in the United States at L TFV, and that a domestic 
industry is being or is likely to be materially injured, or that the establishment 
of such an industry is being retarded by reason of the dumped imports. U7 The 
petition must be accompanied by information supporting these allegations 
which is reasonably available to the petitioner. Under previous regulations, an 
interested party was required to provide detailed descriptions of the goods in-
volved, the fair value of the goods in the exporting country and injury infor-
mation relating to the impact on domestic manufacturers. H8 There had been 
substantial criticism of these petition requirements as being onerous to the 
point of precluding petitioners who had meritorious complaints from obtain-
ing their legal remedy,l+9 
The addition of the language in section 732(b), requiring the petitioner to 
include only information which is • reasonably available,' is a reflection of 
Congressional concern over this matter. The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee has ihdicated that an evaluation of what information is reasonably 
available will be made on the basis of the resources of the individual petitioner, 
although the petitioner will be expected to use reasonable efforts to collect in-
formation from public and industry sources. ISO After receipt of the petition, 
the Secretary has twenty days within which to determine whether or not to ini-
tiate an investigation. lSI If the determination is nt;!gative, the Secretary notifies 
the petitioner and the ITC and terminates the proceedings. ls2 If the deter-
mination is affirmative, the Secretary begins LTFV investigations and 
145. HOUSE REPORT, supra note '103, at 59. 
146. Tariff Act of 1930, S 732(b), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673a(b) (Supp. 1979). Section 771(a), 19 
U.S.C.A. S 1677(a) (Supp. 1979), defines "interested party" as a manufacturer in the United 
States of a product like the one which is being dumped; a certified labor union which is represent-
ative of an industry engaged in the manufacture in the United States of a like product; or a trade 
or business association a majority of whose members manufacture a like product in the United 
States. Id. 
147. Id. S 732(b), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673(b) (Supp. 1979). 
148. 19 C.F.R. S 153.27 (1979). 
149. See, I.g., Myerson, supra note 80, at 192. 
150. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 60. 
151. Tariff Act of 1930, S 732(c), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673a(c) (Supp. 1979). Under the Antidump-
ing Act, 1921, S 321(aX2), 19 U.S.C. S160(cXl) (1976), the Secretary had 30 days in which to 
make this determination. 
152. Tariff Act of 1930, S 732(cX3), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673a(c)(3) (Supp. 1979). 
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publishes notices of this in the Federal Register. 153 The Act further requires 
Treasury to make available to the ITC all information it has relating to the in-
vestigation. l54 
B. PrelimiTUJry DetermiTUJtions 
In every case in which the Treasury Department has commenced an in-
vestigation, the ITC is required to make a determination within 45 days of 
either the date on which the petition was filed, or the date on which the 
Secretary of the Treasury initiated an investigation. 155 The Antidumping Act, 
1921,156 required a preliminary referral to the ITC only if the Secretary con-
cluded that there was substantial doubt as to the question of injury. The ITC 
then had 30 days within which to determine whether there was a reasonable 
indication of injury. The purpose of the new provision is to make United 
States law consistent with the Tokyo Round Agreements. These Agreements 
permit the imposition of provisional measures such as suspension or liquida-
tion of imports and the posting of a cash deposit, bond, or other security on 
each entry subject to the suspension, after an affirmative preliminary deter-
mination of sales at L TFV and material injury .157 The Act requires that the 
ITCprovide interested parties a reasonable opportunity to present their 
views, although not necessarily in a formal hearing. A formal hearing is re-
quired prior to the final determination. 158 Notice ofthe lTC's determination 
is to be published in the Federal Register. 159 If the determination is negative, 
all proceedings are terminated. 160 
The Act further requires the Secretary of the Treasury to make a 
preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or 
suspect that imports are being sold at L TFV. 161 The standard of 'reason to 
believe' in this instance is satisfied if, based on the information available, it 
can be reasonably concluded that sales at L TFV will be found when a final 
determination is reached. 162 This section changes prior law by requiring that 
153. ]d. S 732(c)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673a(c)(2) (Supp. 1979). Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. S 153.30 
(1979), if the Secretary determined that an investigation should be initiated, he was required to 
issue an "Antidumping Proceeding Notice" in the Federal Register within 30 days. ]d. This 
notice had to include a description of the merchandise involved, a statement that there is suffi· 
cient evidence on record concerning injury to, or the retardation of establishment of, an industry 
in the United States. ]d. 
154. Tariff Act of 1930, S 732(d)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673a(d)(2) (Supp. 1979). 
155. ]d. S 733(a), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(a) (Supp. 1979). 
156. S 202(a), 19 U.S.C. S 160(c)(2) (1976). 
157. HOUSE REPORT, su.pra note 103, at 61. 
158. [d. 
159. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(1), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(1) (Supp. 1979). 
160. ]d. S 733(a), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(a) (Supp. 1979). 
161. ]d. S 733(b)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(b)(l) (Supp. 1979). 
162. HOUSE REPORT, su.pra note 103, at 61. 
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the preliminary determination of sales at LTFV be made within 160 days after 
the date on which a petition was rued or after the Secretary initiated an in-
vestigation, rather than within 6 months after the initiation of the investiga-
tion. 163 
1. Time Extensions 
The Act retains the authority contained in priQr law to extend the period 
within which a preliminary determination must be made. Previously, the 
Secretary was allowed to take an additional nine months to make a 
preliminary determination if he concluded that it could not reasonably be 
determined within 6 months. IU The Act of 1979 extends the period within 
which the preliminary determination must be made to the 21 Oth day after the 
filing of the petition or after a self-initiated investigation. 165 Thus, the 
Secretary may postpone the date of the preliminary determination upon a 
timely request of the petitionerl66 or in an extraordinarily complicated case. 167 
A case falls within the latter category by reason of the number and complexity 
of the transactions to be investigated or adjustments to be considered, the 
novelty of the issues presented, or the number of firms whose activity must be 
investigated. 168 Congress has expressed its opinion that the period generally 
allowed for the preliminary determination is sufficient for all but the most 
complicated cases. 169 Further, it warned against the use of the time extension 
163. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(b)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(1) (Supp. 1979). Under prior 
regulations, 19 C. F. R. S 153.35(b)( 1979), the Office of Tariff and Trade Affairs ofthe Treasury 
Department reviewed the recommendations of the Customs Service and issued a tentative 
disposition which took one of three forms: first, a tentative negative determination could have 
issued; second, if the fums under investigation agreed to it, customs appraisement could be 
withheld for at least three months but no more than six months pending a final determination of 
whether there were sales at LTFV (this was the usual practice); third, ifno such agreement was 
reached, the final determination of sales at L TFV was issued simultaneously with the 
withholding of appraisement. /d. If a tentative affirmative decision was reached, the interested 
parties were given another chance to submit additional information at a hearing over which the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tariff and Trade Affairs presided. Id. The additional in-
formation gleaned from this hearing was reviewed by the Assistant Secretary and his staff from 
which a final determination of L TFV sales issued. /d. An affirmative decision resulted in the case 
being referred to the International Trade Commission for consideration of the injury issue pur-
suant to 19 C.F.R. S 153.41 (1979). The Secretary of the Treasury retained the power to revoke 
or modify a finding of sales at LTFV up until an International Trade Commission finding injury 
was made. 19 C.F.R. S 153.42 (1979). 
164. Antidumping Act, 1921, S201(b), 19 U.S.C. S 160(b)(2) (1976). 
165. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(c)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(c)(I) (Supp. 1979). 
166. /d. S 733(c)(I)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(c)(I)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
167. /d. S 733(c)(I)(B)(i), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(cX1)(BXi) (Supp. 1979). 
168. Id. SS 733(c)(I)(BXiXI)-(III), 19 U.S.C.A. is 1673b(c)(I)(BXiXI)-(III) (Supp. 1979). An 
example of a case meeting the last requirement is fresh winter vegetables from Mexico, 43 Fed. 
Rep. 48,753 (1978), a case involving fresh winter vegetables from Mexico grown by several thou-
sand producers. 
169. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 61. 
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provision as a way of avoiding what is called the 'clear and reasonable' time 
limits established in the Act of 1979 for reaching a preliminary deter-
mination. 170 
The time periods contained in the 1979 Act are stated in terms of the max-
imum time available to both the Secretary and the ITC within which to make 
their determinations. 171 Congress expects that if the determinations required 
under the Act can be made in a more timely fashion that they be done so. 172 
2. Preliminary Review and Waiver of Verification 
The Secretary is required to appoint an official to review the information 
developed during during the first 60 days of an investigation for the purpose of 
determining whether such information forms a reasonable basis for the 
preliminary decisionY' The same section allows a petitioner, or any in-
terested party to whom such information is disclosed, to furnish an irrevocable 
written waiver of verification!7. of such information to the Secretary. This 
must be accompanied by an agreement that the party is willing to have a 
preliminary determination made on the basis of the record then available to 
Treasury. If both of these items are furnished, a preliminary determination 
must be made within 90 days after the date on which the investigation was 
commenced.175 The House Committee on Ways and Means indicated that it is 
in the interest of all parties to waive the verification in order to expedite the 
lengthy verfication process. 176 The Committee adds a caveat by recommend-
ing waiver of verification only in situations where the interested parties believe 
that the margins of dumping determined on the basis of such unverified infor-
mation will be reasonably accurate. 177 The Committee further indicated that 
the irrevocable waiver of verification is only to be applied to the information 
actually disclosed to the petitioner .!78 Information not disclosed in this man-
ner!79 and information subsequently provided must independently be verified 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 62. 
172. /d. 
173. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(bX2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673(bX2) (Supp. 1979). 
174. /d. S 776, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677e (Supp. 1979), requires that all information relied on by 
the Secretary in making a final determination regarding L TFV sales must be verified unless, with 
respect to an antidumping proceeding, verification is waived. If the Secretary is not able to verify 
the information submitted, he must rely on the best information available, which may include the 
information submitted in the petition. Similarly, whenever a party or any other person refuses or 
is unable to produce information in a timely manner and in the form required, or otherwise 
significantly impedes an investigation, the Secretary and the ITC must use the best information 
available. 
175. Id. S 733(bX2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(b)(2) (Supp. 1979). 
176. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 62. 
177. /d. 
178. Id. 
179. Confidential information is not disclosed in the course of antidumping proceedings. 19 
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if the Secretary relies on it in making the final determination. 180 Notice of the 
preliminary determination must be published in the Federal Register and 
given to the petitioner (if any) and other parties to the investigation. 181 
Following an affirmative preliminary determination, the liquidation of en-
tries of merchandise under investigation is suspended. 182 This procedure is 
identical to prior law. 185 The Act changes the law by explicitly authorizing the 
Secretary to require the posting of a cash deposit, bond, or other security, 184 as 
deemed appropriate to ensure protection of the anticipated dumping duties. 185 
3. Retroactive Assessments 
Under prior law, the Secretary had complete discretion to assess antidump-
ing duties retroactively on unliquidated entries of merchandise entered before 
the notice of suspension of liquidation. 186 The Secretary could apply a suspen-
sion of liquidation order to unliquidated entries entered not more than 120 
days prior to the date of initiation of an investigation. 187 If a dumping finding 
was ultimately reached, the Secretary was required to assess appropriate 
dumping duties with respect to all entries for which liquidation was sus-
pended. 188 
The Act of 1979 changes prior law both procedurally and substantively with 
regard to the retroactive assessment of antidumping duties. 189 This change 
makes United States law consistent with the amended Antidumping Agree-
ment in the recently concluded MTN.190 The section requires that the retroac-
tive application of the order to suspend liquidation to unliquidated entries be 
made not more than 90 days prior to the date of the notice of the suspension 
order if critical circumstances are found to exist. 191 Critical circumstances ex-
C.F.R. S 153.23 (1979) sets standards for determining whether information is confidential. Infor-
mation is considered confidential if its disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to 
a competitor or would have a significant adverse effect upon a person supplying the information 
or upon a person from whom the information was acquired. Id. 
180. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 62. 
181. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(1), 19 U .S.C.A. S 1673b(1) (Supp. 1979). 
182. [d. S 733(d)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(dXl) (Supp. 1979). 
183. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(b), 19 U.S.C.A. S 160(b)(IXB) (1976). 
184. E.g., a letter of credit. 
185. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(d)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(dX2) (Supp. 1979). The Treasury 
Department has stated its intent to require cash deposits only in those cases where it believes that 
bonds or other forms of security will not adequately protect the anticipated dumping duties. 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 62. Since a finding of injurious dumping has not been finally 
determined at this point in the investigation, the requirement of a case deposit might represent an 
onerous burden to the importer and so stir up needless international economic anxiety. Id. 
186. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(b), 19 U.S.C. S 160(bXIXB) (1976). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(eX2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(e)(2) (Supp. 1979). 
190. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 68. 
191. Tariff Act of 1930, S 733(eX2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(e)(2) (Supp. 1979). 
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ist: 1) where there is a history of dumping, in the United States or elsewhere, 
of the merchandise under investigation; 2) where the importer knew or should 
have known that the exporter was selling the merchandise at L TFV; or 3) 
where there have been massive imports of the merchandise over a relatively 
short period and the industry is being materially injured by reason of such im-
ports. 192 This provision was designed to provide prompt relief to domestic in-
dustries suffering from a large volume of imports over a very short period of 
time. 193 It is also intended to deter exporters of merchandise that is subject to 
an investigation from circumventing the intent of the law by increasing their 
exports to the United States during the period between the initiation of an in-
vestigation and a preliminary determination by Treasury. 194 
C. Termination of Investigation 
The Act of 1979 provides for the termination of an investigation by the 
Secretary or the ITC upon the withdrawal of the petition requesting an in-
vestigation, but not before a preliminary determination has been reached. 195 
D. Suspension of Investigation 
An investigation may be suspended prior to a final determination by the 
Secretary on the issue of dumping in two instances. First, if exporters account-
ing for substantially all of the imports of the merchandise under investigation 
voluntarily agree to eliminate dumping, or to cease exports ofthe merchandise 
to the United States within 6 months of suspension of the investigation. 196 Sec-
ond, if extraordinary circumstances are present, and the exporters described 
above agree to revise prices so as to completely eliminate the injurious effect of 
the imports of the merchandise under investigation. Upon being petitioned, 
the ITC may review such agreements. 197 If it determines that the injurious ef-
fect has not been eliminated, the investigation must be completed. 198 If the 
Secretary determines that an agreement which resulted in a suspension of an 
192. /d. S 733(eXl), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673b(eXl) (Supp. 1979). A history of dumping may be 
found to exist if the class or kind of merchandise under investigation was subject to a dumping 
finding whether in the United States or in another country. /d. 
193. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 63. 
194. /d. 
195. Tariff Act of 1930, S 734(a), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(a) (Supp. 1979). 
196. /d. S 734(b), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673(b) (Supp. 1979). The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee intends the phrase "exporters accounting for substantially all the imports ofthe merchan-
dise" to mean exporters accounting for at least 85 percent ofthe imports during the most recent 
representative period. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 64. The validity of the agreement 
depends on the continuous fulfillment ofthis requirement. Thus, if the exporters who are party to 
the agreement cease at any time to represent at least 85 percent of the imports of the merchan-
dise, the agreement will cease to have effect. /d. 
197. Tariff Act of 1930, S 734(c), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(c) (Supp. 1979). 
198. /d. 
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investigation is being violated, then the investigation shall be resumed. Unliq-
uidated imports of the merchandise become liable for antidumping duties 
retroactively if entered on or after the later of 90 days before the date of the af-
firmative preliminary determination or the date of the violation. 199 
1. Agreements Eliminating Sales At L TFV 
Section 734(b) of the Act of 1930 permits the Secretary to suspend an in-
vestigation by accepting an agreement that provides for the cessation of ex-
ports of the merchandise within 6 months, or for an immediate revision in 
prices which results in the complete elimination of the dumping margin. This 
agreement must contain an anti-surge provision to preclude circumvention of 
the purpose of the agreement. 2oo The anti-surge provision prevents exporters 
from flooding the market immediately after an agreement has been reached. It 
must guarantee that the quantity of merchandise entered during the period 
provided for cessation of exports does not exceed the quantity exported during 
the most recent representative period. 
2. Agreements Eliminating the Injurious Effect of Dumping 
In certain extraordinary circumstances,201 the Secretary may accept a price 
agreement which does not completely eliminate the dumping margin so long 
as the Agreement completely eliminates the injurious effect of the dumped im-
199. Under 19 C.F.R. S 153.33 (1979), the Secretary discontinued an investigation at any 
time if he was satisfied that (1) possible margins of dumping were minimal in relation to export 
volume, price revisions were made which eliminated any likelihood of L TFV sales, and 
assurances had been given that no future L TFV sales would occur; (2) sales to the United States 
were terminated and assurances had been given that they would not resume; or (3) there were 
other circumstances on the basis of which it was no longer appropriate to continue the investiga-
tion.Id. The Tariff Act of 1930, S 734, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c (Supp. 1979), provides a statutory 
basis for the suspension of an investigation. In so doing, it eliminates the restriction in (I) that 
dumping margins be minimal and the unfettered discretion in (3) and replaces them with specific 
criteria and requirements. The bill improves the procedural safeguards under present law by pro-
viding increased participation by the petitioner and allowing an exporter to demonstrate that he 
is not dumping. [d. 
200. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 64. 
201. "Extraordinary circumstances" is defined in the Tariff Act of 1930, S 734(c)(2XA), 19 
U.S.C.A. S 1673c(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979), as circumstances (a) in which the suspension of the in-
vestigation will be more beneficial to the domestic industry than continuation of the investiga-
tion, and (b) in which the case is complex. With regard to the first factor, the language of the 
statute is general so as to provide the Secretary with flexibility in administering the provision. 
However, the provision is not intended to be so general as to be meaningless. HOUSE REPORT, 
su.pra note 103, at 64. For example, the expenses saved because of prompt settlement of a case or 
the certainty of prompt relief may make settlement more beneficial than continuation of the in-
vestigation. However, every suspension of an investigation results in prompt, certain relief and 
reduced expenses. Id. Th,e Ways and Means Committee though, does not intend that every 
agreement be deemed more beneficial to domestic industry. Id. Rather, the benefits to the peti-
tioner of early settlement must be weighed against the possible relief resulting from a complete in-
vestigation, Id. For purposes of the provision, a case may be deemed "complex" because there 
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portS. 202 There are two essential requirements for this Agreement: 1) the price 
level of domestic products must not be undercut or supressed by such 
imports,203 and 2) the amount by which the estimated foreign market value 
(FMV) surpasses the United States price must not exceed 15 percent of the 
weighted average dumping margin for all sales of the exporter examined dur-
ing the investigation. 20+ 
It should be noted that the authority to suspend investigations under this 
section of the Act is discretionary and subject to the overriding requirement 
that suspension is in the public interest. 205 Moreover, effective monitoring of 
the Agreement must be practicable for the Agreement to remain valid. 206 
3. Procedures For Suspending an Investigation 
The Act requires the Secretary to consult with the petitioner and to notify 
all parties at least 30 days prior to a suspension. At that time, the petitioner is 
to receive a proposed copy of the agreement and an explanation of the method 
of enforcement. 207 All parties are to be given an opportunity to submit com-
ments and information for the record prior to the suspension of the investiga-
tion.208 The Secretary may not suspend an investigation until on or after the 
date on which it issues an affirmative preliminary determination. The purpose 
of this provision is to ensure that the Secretary has developed sufficient infor-
mation regarding potential dumping margins to form a reasonable basis for an 
agreement. The agreement must revise prices in order to eliminate either the 
full margin of dumping or at least 85 percent of that margin and any injurious 
effect of dumped imports. 
The investigation must be suspended upon the date of publication of the 
notice of suspension in the Federal Register. If the suspension of the investiga-
tion is based on an agreement to eliminate the injurious effect of the dumped 
merchandise, then suspension ofliquidation will begin or continue, despite the 
suspension of the investigation. Liquidation of entries will remain suspended 
until the termination of the period within which interested domestic parties 
are a large number of transactions to be investigated or claims for adjustments to be considered, 
the issues raised are novel, or a large number of firms are involved. /d. 
202. Tariff Act of 1930, § 734(c), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673(c) (Supp. 1979). 
203. /d. § 734(c)(I)(A), 19 U .S.C.A. § 1673(c)(I)(A) (Supp. 1979). The existence of such price 
undercutting would constitute a violation of the agreement. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 
64. 
204. Tariff Act of 1930, S 734(c)(I)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(c)(I)(B) (Supp. 1979). This pro-
vision establishes a minimum price revision, that is, a revision if a lesser amount per St fails to 
eliminate the injurious effect. The provision should not be interpreted, however, as meaning that 
a price revision in the minimum allowable amount per se eliminates the injurious effect. HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 103, at 64. 
205. Tariff Act of 1930, S 734(d)(I)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(d)(I)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
206. /d. § 734(d)(I)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(d)(I)(B) (Supp. 1979). 
207. /d. § 734(e)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(e)(2) (Supp. 1979). 
208. /d. § 734(e)(3), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673c(e)(3) (Supp. 1979). 
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can seek review of the agreement by the ITC. If review is sought, suspension 
of liquidation will continue until the ITC determines that the agreement will 
eliminate the injurious effect of the imports subject to the investigation. 209 
4-• Review of Suspension 
A United States manufacturer of a like product, a labor union which is 
representative of an industry engaged in the domestic manufacturing of a like 
product, or a trade or business association a majority of whose members 
manufacture a like product may, within 20 days after the date of suspension of 
an investigation based on an agreement to eliminate the injurious effect of the 
dumped imports, me a petition with the ITC requesting a review of the 
suspension. 2lO The ITC is required to determine within 75 days whether the 
agreement will eliminate completely the injurious effect of the dumped im-
ports. If the determination is affirmative, the agreement remains in effect and 
suspension of the investigation continues; if it is negative, the agreement is set 
aside and the investigation is resumed as if the preliminary affirmative deter-
mination were made on the date of the lTC's negative determination. 211 
5. Violation of an Agreement 
If the Secretary determines that an agreement which is the basis for the 
suspension of an investigation has been violated, or no longer meets the re-
quirements of the Act, he must suspend liquidation with respect to unliq-
uidated entries of merchandise entered on or after the date on which the viola-
tion first occurred. 212 If the investigation had not been completed, the in-
vestigation is resumed and,213 if the investigation had been complete, an an-
tidumping order is issued.2U 
209. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the domestic industry is fully protected in 
the event that an agreement is found not to eliminate completely the injurious effect of the 
dumped imports. HOUSE REPORTS. supra note 103, at 66. However, if upon review, the ITC finds 
that the injurious effect has not been completely eliminated, the suspension of liquidation could 
remain in effect for a longer period than that permitted under the international Antidumping 
Agreement. [d. To preclude chalienges to the U.S. procedures in the GATT, the House Ways & 
Means Committee required a waiver of the relevant provisions of the Antidumping Agreement as 
a precondition to any suspension of investigation which purports to.eliminate the injurious effect 
of the dumped imports. /d. See also Antidumping Agreement, supra note 68, art. 5. 
210. Tariff Act of 1930, S 734(h)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(h)(I) (Supp. 1979). 
211. /d. S 734(h)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(hX2) (Supp. 1979). 
212. Id. S 734(iXl)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(i)(I)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
213. /d. S 734(i)(I)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(iXIXB) (Supp. 1979). 
214. /d. S 734(iXl)(C), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673c(i)(I)(C) (Supp. 1979). Intentional violations of 
an agreement are treated in the same manner as a fraudulent violation of § 592 of the Act of 1930, 
19 U.S.C. S 1592 (1976) - i.e., forfeiture of the goods involved. However, this provision is not in-
tended to require that the violation involve a false statement or declaration as required under S 
592. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 66. 
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6. Continuation of Investigation 
To conform United States law to the provisions of the multilateral anti-
dumping agreement215 section 734(g) provides that, if exporters representing a 
significant proportion of the trade in the merchandise under investigation 
make a timely request, the investigation will continue despite the publication 
of a notice to suspend the investigation. When an investigation is so con-
tinued, if the final determination by either the Secretary, relating to sales at 
less than fair value, or the lTC, relating to injury, is negative, then the agree-
ment on which the suspension of investigation is based will cease to have effect 
and the investigation must be terminated. If the final determinations by the 
Secretary and the ITC are affirmative, the agreement will remain in force and 
an antidumping duty order will not be issued so long as the agreement re-
mains in effect. The bill also provides that suspended investigations will be 
continued upon a timely request by a domestic interested party to the in-
vestigation. 216 
E. Final Determinations 
1. Final Determination of Sales at L TFV 
The Act amends prior law by reducing from 90 to 75 days the time in which 
the Secretary must generally make a final determination of sales at L TFV. ZI7 
The period for this determination may be extended, at the discretion of the 
Secretary for up to 135 days upon the request of exporters representing a 
significant proportion of the imported merchandise (if the preliminary deter-
mination of the Secretary was affirmative)218 or the petitioner (if the 
preliminary determination of the Secretary was negative).219 This provision 
appears to balance the need for expedited proceedings with the concern that 
the proceedings must not become so abbreviated as to result in arbitrary deci-
sions220 and provides enough flexibility to extend the period for a final deter-
mination where necessary. 
If the Secretary reaches a final negative determination, all proceedings stop, 
including any injury investigation being conducted by the ITC. This was the 
same under prior law. 221 However, under the Act of 1979, the effect of a final 
affirmative determination depends upon the nature of the Secretary's 
215. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 68, art. 5. 
216. For a definition of "interested party", see note 146 supra. 
217. Compare Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(a), 19 U.S.C. S 160(a) (1976), with Tariff Act of 
1930, S 735(aX1), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(aXl) (Supp. 1979). 
218. Tariff Act of 1930, S 735(a)(2XA), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(aX2XA) (Supp. 1979). 
219. [d. S 735(aX2)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(a)(2XB) (Supp. 1979). 
220. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 67. 
221. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(b), 19 U.S.C. S 160(bXIXC) (1976). 
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preliminary determination. If the preliminary determination was negative and 
the final determination is affirmative, the Secretary must order the suspension 
of liquidation in accordance with section 733(d) and make available to the ITC 
information upon which the final determination was based. 222 The ITC then 
begins its injury investigation. If the preliminary determination was affirm-
ative and the final determination is negative, the Secretary must then ter-
minate any retroactive suspension of liquidation and also must release any 
bond or security and refund any cash deposit with respect to entries of mer-
chandise as to which liquidation was retroactively suspended. 223 
2. Final Determination of Injury 
The Act requires the ITC to make a final determination as to whether a 
domestic industry is being materially injured, threatened with material injury, 
or whether the establishment of a domestic industry is being materially retard-
ed. 224 The Act changes prior law with respect to a final injury determination 
by the ITC both in terms of the point at which the determination begins and 
the total period of investigation preceeding the final determination. Under the 
Antidumping Act, 1921, the ITC began its injury determination only after the 
Secretary made a final determination of sales at L TFV. m 
The new provisions of the Act of 1930 expedite the proceedings by requiring 
the ITC to being its injury investigation upon notice of an affirmative 
preliminary determination by the Secretary. 226 The ITC has 120 days within 
which to complete its investigation. This time frame provides the ITC with at 
least 45 days after the final affirmative determination by the Secretary to com-
plete its investigation. This allows it to take into account any difference be-
tween the Secretary's preliminary and final determinations. Such differences 
may appear in dumping margins. If the preliminary determination of the 
Secretary is negative, then the ITC must make its final injury determination 
no later than 75 days after the date of the Secretary's final affirmative deter-
mination. 227 If the ITC determination is negative, the investigation ter-
minates. 228 If an affirmative determination is made, the Secretary must 
publish an antidumping order within 7 days of receiving notice of the ITC 
determination. 229 . 
If the ITC finds threat of material injury (rather than actual material in-
jury) it must also determine whether material injury would have been found 
222. Tariff Act of 1930, S 735(c)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(c)(I) (Supp. 1979). 
223. !d. S 735(cX3), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(cX3) (Supp. 1979). 
224. !d. S 735(bXI), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(bXI) (Supp. 1979). 
225. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(a), 19 U.S.C. S 160(a) (1976). 
226. Tariff Act of 1930, S 735(b)(2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(bX2) (Supp. 1979). 
227. !d. S 735(bX3), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(bX3) (Supp. 1979). 
228. [d. S 735(cX2), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(cX2) (Supp. 1979). 
229. !d. 
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but for the suspension of liquidation ordered by the Secretary following its in-
itial affirmative finding. If material injury would have been found, the an-
tidumping order shall apply with respect to entries subject to the notice of 
suspension of liquidation. 230 
Both the ITC and the Secretary must provide interested parties with an op-
portunity to present their views orally before they make their final determina-
tions. 231 This is not a formal hearing within the meaning of § 556 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act,232 and does not necessarily involve the examina-
tion or cross-examination of witnesses under oath. It is the intent of Congress 
that interested parties be permitted to make timely submissions of written 
views at any point in the proceeding. This includes the opportunity to rebut 
statements presented orally. 233 
If critical circumstances have been alleged during the investigation, the final 
determinations of both the Secretary and the ITC must contain findings as to 
whether the elements of critical circumstances have in fact been shown. 234 If 
the findings are affirmative, the antidumping order will apply to entries sub-
ject to the retroactive suspension of liquidation. 235 
Notice of all determinations made by the Secretary and the ITC must be 
published in the Federal Register. Such notice need not contain the findings of 
fact or conclusions of law on which the determination is based. However, this 
information must be publicly available, and the notice must indicate where it 
can be obtained. 236 
F. Assessment of Antidumping Duties 
In response to a 3 ~ year average delay between entry of merchandise sub-
ject to a dumping finding and assessment of actual dumping duties,237 the new 
provisions of the Act of 1930 provide for expeditious administration of an an-
tidumping order. This is accomplished in two ways. First, maximum time 
limits on assessment are established. 238 Thus assessment of dumping duties 
must occur within 6 months after the date on which the Secretary receives 
230. /d. S 735(bX4)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(bX4XB) (Supp. 1979). 
231. /d. S 735(d), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(d) (Supp. 1979). 
232. 5 U.S.C. S 556 (1976). This section regulates hearings before federal agencies. 
233. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 103, at 68. 
234. Tariff Act of 1930, S 735(aX3), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(aX3) (Supp. 1979). Critical cir-
cumstances exist where there is a previous history of dumping in the United States or elsewhere of 
the merchandise under question and the importer knew or should have known that the exporter 
was selling the merchandise at LTFV, and where there has been massive imports of the merchan-
dise under investigation. /d. 
235. /d. S 735(bX4XA), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(b)(4XA) (Supp. 1979). 
236. /d. S 735(d), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673d(d) (Supp. 1979). 
237. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 103, at 69. 
238. There were no maximum time limits on assessment of dumping duties under the An-
tidumping Act, 1921. 
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satisfactory information upon which to base an assessment. In no event may it 
occur later than 1 year after the end of the annual accounting period of the 
manufacturer or exporter during which the merchandise is entered. 239 Second, 
the Act requires that merchandise subject to an antidumping order be entered 
only upon the deposit of estimated antidumping duties. 240 Under prior law, 
such merchandise was permitted to enter under bond. 241 • 
There is a limited exception to the requirement of a deposit of estimated 
duties for importers who have taken certain actions either to eliminate or 
substantially reduce dumping margins between the date of an affirmative 
preliminary determination by the Secretary and the final affirmative deter-
mination by the ITC. 242 Thus, for a three month period following the issuance 
of an antidumping order, the Secretary may continue to permit entry of mer-
chandise subject to the order under bond for individual importers if there is 
reason to believe that those importers have taken steps to revise their prices to 
result in a significantly lower dumping margin. During this three-month 
period, the Secretary will examine the merchandise that entered during the 
period between its own preliminary determination and the lTC's final deter-
mination. If assessment on such entries can be made within the three month 
period in accordance with the procedures of section 737(b) of the Act of 1930, 
then assessment will take place and the new dumping margins derived from 
this assessment will serve as the basis for the deposit of estimated duties on 
future entries. 243 
Antidumping duties are assessed on entries of merchandise subject to an an-
tidumping order made on or after the date on which notice of an affirmative 
ITC final determination is published. 2H 
The new provisions of the Act of 1930 amend prior law to bring it into con-
239. Tariff Act of 1930, S 736(a)(IXA), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673e(a)(I)(A) (Supp. 1979). In the 
case ofa related party transaction, that is, where the U.S. price is not determined until the goods 
are sold after their entry into the United States, the maximum period for assessment will be 12 
months after the end of the accounting period within which the merchandise is sold to an 
unrelated purchaser in the United States. /d. 
240. Id. S 736(a)(3), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673e(a)(3) (Supp. 1979). 
241. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 201(b), 19 U.S.C. S 160(b) (1976). In its report, the House 
Ways and Means Committee stated its dissatisfaction with the prior law in that it did not deter 
dumping. HOUSE REPORT, lupra note 103, at 69. Rather, the Committee stated, it provided an 
incentive to exporters and importers to delay submitting information necessary to form the basis 
of an assessment. Id. The case deposit provision is an attempt to ensure that complete informa-
tion will be submitted to the Secretary in a timely manner. The Committee went on to state its 
concern with the effect that the requirement of a cash deposit of estimated duties will have on 
small importers who have taken steps to eliminate dumping. /d. at 70. 
242. Tariff Act of i930, S 737(b), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673f(b) (Supp. 1979). 
243. /d. S 736(3), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673e(3) (Supp. 1979). 
244. /d. S 736(b)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1673e(b)(I) (Supp. 1979). Antidumping duties are also 
assessed upon issuance of an antidumping order covering entries of merchandise, the liquidation 
of which had been suspended during an investigation pursuant to S 733(d), 19 U.S.C.A. S 
1673b(d) (Supp. 1979), unless (1) in the case ofa retroactive suspension of liquidation based on 
allegations of critical circumstances it is finally determined that critical circumstances do not exist 
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formity with the Antidumping Agreements by requiring that the difference 
between a cash deposit collected as security on an entry of merchandise subject 
to a notice of suspension of liquidation under section 733( d) and the amount of 
the duty finally assessed must be disregarded if the deposit is less, and refund-
ed if the deposit is greater, than the amount finally assessed. 245 
G. Administrative Review 
The new Title VII of the Act of 1930, as contained in the Act of 1979, re-
quires the Secretary to review the amount of any antidumping duty and the 
current status of, and compliance with, any agreement which suspended an 
investigation, at least once during each 12 month period beginning on the an-
niversary of the date of the publication of the antidumping order. 246 A sum-
mary of the results of this review along with the notice of any duty to be asses-
sed, estimated duty to be deposited, or investigation to be resumed, is to be 
published in the Federal Register. 247 
The Act also requires both the Secretary and the ITC to review an agree-
ment which served as the basis for the suspension of an antidumping duty in-
vestigation. 248 An affirmative determination that such an agreement will com-
pletely eliminate the injurious effect of dumped imports, that L TFV sales ex-
(in which case entries subject to the retroactive suspension would not be subject to antidumping 
duties); or (2) the ITC does not find threat of material injury that, but for the suspension of li-
quidation, would have been material injury by reason ofless than fair value imports. [d. 
245. Compare Tariff Act of 1930, S 737,19 U.S.C.A. S 1673f(Supp. 1979), with Antidumping 
Agreement, supra note 68, art. 2( c). In order to ensure that neither the United States Government 
nor the importer suffers a loss from an underestimate or overestimate of antidumping duties, the 
Act requires a payment of interest in an amount equal to the rate in effect under section 6621 of 
the Internal Revenue Code or 8 percent, whichever is higher, on overpayments of cash deposits 
on estimated duties. Tariff Act of 1930, S 778, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677g (Supp. 1979). 
246. [d. S 751(a)(I)(B)(C), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1675(a)(I)(B)(C) (Supp. 1979). Under prior law, 
the Secretary of the Treasury determined the amount of an antidumping duty on an entry-by-
entry basis. Adjustments to foreign market value for differences in circumstances of sales and ad-
justments to other price calculations were made from time to time, as necessary. Antidumping 
Act, 1921, § 202(a), 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1976). The need for an antidumping duty was reviewed by 
the Secretary on his own motion or at the request of an interested party if there were changed cir-
cumstances. [d. 
The ITC reviewed an injury finding in an antidumping case on its own motion, at the request 
of an interested party, or upon advice from Treasury that there were changed circumstances. 19 
C.F.R. § 207.5 (1979). Absent "good cause", the ITC would not review an injury determination 
within two years of a final determination that injury existed. /d. 
247. Tariff Act of 1930, §751(a)(I), 19V.S.C.A. S 1675(a)(I)(Supp.1979). The results of the 
review should include a determination of the foreign market value and the United States price of 
each entry of merchandise included within the review, and the amount, ifany, by which the fair 
market value (FMV) of each entry exceeds the Vnited States price of entry. [d. This determina-
tion will serve as the basis for the assessment of antidumping duties covering merchandise includ-
ed in the review but not considered under the original investigation, as well as for deposits of 
estimated duty on similar entries not covered by the review. /d. S 751(a)(2), 19 V.S.C.A. S 
1675(a)(2) (Supp. 1979). 
248. ld. S 751(b)(1), 19 V.S.C.A. S 1675(b)(I) (Supp. 1979). 
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ist, or that a domestic industry is being injured by reason of imports sold at 
L TFV is subject to review. 249 The Secretary and the ITC may initiate a 
review under this section only if they are satisfied that 'changed cir-
cumstances' sufficient to warrant review exist. 250 The ITC may not review a 
final affirmative injury determination absent a showing of good cause. 251 The 
Secretary may not review a determination to suspend an investigation or a 
final affirmative determination of sales at L TFV less than 24 months after the 
date of publication of their notice. 252 If the Secretary determines that sales at 
L TFV no longer exist, he may revoke an antidumping order in whole or in 
part. 253 
H. Judicial Reviewm 
Title X of the Act of 1979 provides for appeal of certain interlocutory and all 
final rulings by the Secretary or the ITC in antidumping cases. 255 Structural-
ly, Title X amends the Tariff Act of 1930, by adding a new section 516A, 
which sets out specific judicial review procedures for antidumping and 
countervailing duty proceedings. 256 The provision provides a statutory listing 
of those specific determinations which are reviewable. This results in in-
creased due process safeguards and expedites judicial relief. 
249. [d. 
250. /d. 
251. [d. S 751(b)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1675(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
252. /d. S 751(b)(2)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1675(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979). 
253. /d. S 751(c), 19 U.S.C.A. (c) (Supp. 1979). 
254. The United States Customs court has exclusive jurisdiction for review of antidumping 
orders. /d. S 516(a), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(a) (Supp. 1979). The principal offices of the Customs 
Court are located in New York City, but the court is empowered to hear and determine cases 
arising in other locations of the United States. The court still "rides circuit" and thus there 
should be no great burden on petitioners who are located great distances from New York. HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 103, at 179. 
255. Tariff Act of 1930, S 516A, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a (Supp. 1979). The Act provided judicial 
review of determinations by the Customs Service of the appraised value, classification, or rate of 
duty of imported goods. /d. Further, the Act provides for judicial review of Customs Service deci-
sions regarding the certification "country of origin" markings. [d. Under prior law judicial 
review was provided for determinations of foreign market value, determinations of purchase or 
exporter's price, and the actual assessment of dumping duties. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 210, 19 
U.S.C. S 169 (1976). Appeals were heard in the United States Customs Court, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, and via a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court. /d. 
The act did not provide for review of Commission determinations of injury, but it did provide for 
review of the requirement that the injury found be to an industry in the United States. /d. 
Challenges to injury findings could be accomplished solely through a challenge to the initial find-
ings of sales at LTFV. /d. See also 19 C.F.R. S 153.65(b) (1979). For a complete analysis of 
judicial review under the Antidumping Act, 1921, s .. Metzger & Mursey, Judicial Review of Tariff 
Commission Actions and Proceedings, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 285 (1971). 
256. Prior S 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. S 1516 (1976), has been amended to 
delete those procedures dealing with antidumping and countervailing duty determinations and 
will now address procedures for a domestic party's contest of appraised value, classification, or 
the rate of duty of imported merchandise. /d. S 516A, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a (Supp. 1979). 
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1. Standing to Appeal 
The Act enlarges the class of those parties who have standing to challenge a 
ruling. Any interested party who is also a party to the proceedings now has the 
right to appear and be heard as a party in interest before the United States 
Customs Court. 257 Therefore, in addition to manufacturers, producers, or 
wholesalers in the United States of a like product, standing is accorded to a 
certified union, a recognized union or group of workers which is represent-
ative of an industry engaged in the production in the United States of a like 
product, as well as to a trade or business association, a majority of whose 
members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the United 
States. 258 This should serve to encourage parties to participate in the pro-
ceedings since such participation is a prerequisite to appeals of any determina-
tions. 
2. Scope of Review 
The new provisions provide for judicial review of all final, and several in-
terlocutory, determinations made by the Secretary and the ITC during an-
tidumping or countervailing duty proceedings. 759 Prior law provided only for 
review of negative determinations by the Secretary of the Treasury. 260 
3. Standard of Review 
The new judicial review provisions provide two standards of review for two 
types of determinations. 261 Interlocutory determinations as to whether or not 
to initiate an investigation, that a case is extraordinarily complicated, not to 
review an agreement based on changed circumstances, and determinations as 
to whether there is reasonable indication of material injury are judged by an 
arbitrary and capricious standard. 262 Administrative level determinations such 
as whether sales at L TFV exist or whether a domestic industry is being 
materially injured are judged by a substantial evidence standard. 263 
De novo review of determinations or assessments made pursuant to the an-
tidumping laws is eliminated by the Act. The rationale for de novo review was 
the need to safeguard the rights of all parties to an antidumping proceeding, 
which were informal, non-adverserial and not subject to Administrative Pro-
257. /d. § 516A(d), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(d) (Supp. 1979). 
258. /d. §S 771(aXC), (D) & (E), 19 U.S.C.A. H 1677(a)(C), (D) & (E) (Supp. 1979). 
259. /d. S 516A(d), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(d) (Supp. 1979). 
260. /d. U SI6A(a)(A) & (B), 19 U.S.C.A. U 1516a(A) & (B), (Supp. 1979), explicitly pro-
vides for judicial review of the amount of an antidumping duty assessment and a decision by the 
Secretary of the Treasury not to assess a duty at all. /d. 
261. [d. S 516A(b)(I), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(b)(I) (Supp. 1979). 
262. /d. § 516A(bXI)(A), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(I)(A) (Supp. 1979). 
263. /d. § 516A(b)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(bXI)(B) (Supp. 1979). 
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cedure Act requirements. 264 The amendments made by Title I of the Act of 
1979 providing for substantially increased access by all parties to information 
upon which the decision of the Secretary or the ITC is based265 together with a 
requirement of a record of the proceedings266 has removed the need for review 
of this type. 267 
4. Review Procedures 
Any party with standing can challenge a determination in the Customs 
Court within 30 days of notice of the determination. 268 These cases are given 
priority on the court's docket, with cases involving a challenge to an in-
terlocutory order given preference. 269 
5. Remedies 
The Act permits the Customs Court to enjoin liquidation of some or all en-
tries of merchandise covered by a determination of the Secretary or the ITC. 
Prior law required merchandise to be liquidated in accordance with the ad-
ministrative decision if entered prior to the first ruling of a court adverse to the 
administrative decision. 270 Although there is a presumption of administrative 
correctness under the Act of 1979,271 the court is permitted to enjoin liquida-
tion in appropriate circumstances. 272 
264. See text accompanying note 232 supra. 
265. Tariff Act of 1930, S 777, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1677f(Supp. 1979), provides for increased ac-
cess to all information generated during antidumping proceedings. The section calls for: 1) the 
establishment of a library containing information on foreign subsidy practices; id ... 2) the ITC 
and the Secretary to inform interested parties of the process of any investigation, id ... and 3) a 
record to be kept of all ex parte proceedings. ]d. 
266. ]d. S 516A(bX2XAXi), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1979). 
267. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 181. 
268. Tariff Act of 1930, S 516A(e), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(e) (Supp. 1979). 
269. ]d. S 516A(f), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(f) (Supp. 1979). This provision represents a signifi-
cant departure from prior law both in terms of shortening the overall review process and 
eliminating the disparity in review procedures provided to importers and domestic interested par-
ties. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 103, at 79. Under prior law, most challenges began in the form of 
a protest and review at the admini.trative level. Antidumping Act, 1921, S 210, 19 U.S.C. S 169 
(1976). In the case of importer protests, the Customs Service could take as long as two years to 
grant or deny the protest. The Secretary was under no time limit to make decisions with respect 
to protests by domestic manufacturers. ]d. Under S 751(a) ofthe Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. 
S 1675(a) (Supp. 1979), a 30 day period is provided to all parties to commence an action. ]d. This 
replaces the prior period of 180 days for importers and 30 days for domestic manufacturers. An-
tidumping Act, 1921, S 210, 19 U.S.C. S 169 (1976). 
270. ]d. 
271. Tariff Act of 1930, S 516A(a)(2XB), 19 U.S.C.A. S 1516a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979). 
272. This provision is intended to remedy a disparity in prior law between the relief available 
to importers and that available to domestic manufacturers. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 103, at 
182. Under the Tariff Act of 1930, S 514, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1514 (Supp. 1979) an importer could 
appeal every entry subject to an antidumping order. If he was successful, all duties would be 
refunded, affording the importer complete relief. ]d. The domestic manufacturer could only ap-
peal certain entries as test cases, ]d. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Recent Development has been to examine nontariff 
barriers in general and to provide a guide to current antidumping procedures 
in the United States. After providing a general discussion of non tariff barriers 
and their economic effects on world trade, the recently concluded Tokyo 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was examined. Finally, the new 
United States antidumping procedures under the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979 was compared with the old procedures under the Antidumping Act, 
1921. 
The antidumping provisions contained in the Act of 1979 punctuate the 
legal axiom that the procedures for the enforcement of a statute are often more 
important than the substantive content of the statute. While the substantive 
material injury test should, to some extent, achieve its objective of reducing 
the barrier to free trade that an unchecked use of antidumping duties can pre-
sent, the procedural aspects of the Act, such as the requirement that the 
Secretary of the Treasury initiate dumping investigations sua sponte, the 
retroactive application of dumping duties and the broad judicial review and 
remedies available, may reduce the usefulness of the more stringent material 
injury standard. Whether these procedures strike an effective balance between 
the international drive towards free trade and the need to protect domestic in-
dustries, or whether they merely serve to take with one hand what was given 
by another, remains to be seen. There can be no doubt, however, that the new 
antidumping procedures help eliminate the uncertainties arising out of the old 
procedures and thus reduce the effectiveness of antidumping duties as a non-
tariff trade barrier. 
Jeffrey Burton Sklaroff 
